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DATA RE-USE AND THE PROBLEM
OF GROUP IDENTITY
Leslie P. Francis and John G. Francis
ABSTRACT
Re-using existing data sets of health information for public health or medical
research has much to recommend it. Much data re-purposing in medical or
public health research or practice involves information that has been stripped
of individual identifiers but some does not. In some cases, there may have
been consent to the re-use but in other cases consent may be absent and
people may be entirely unaware of how the data about them are being used.
Data sets are also being combined and may contain information with very
different sources, consent histories, and individual identifiers. Much of the
ethical and policy discussion about the permissibility of data re-use has cen-
tered on two questions: for identifiable data, the scope of the original consent
and whether the re-use is permissible in light of that scope, and for de-identi-
fied data, whether there are unacceptable risks that the data will be re-identi-
fied in a manner that is harmful to any data subjects. Prioritizing these
questions rests on a picture of the ethics of data use as primarily about
respecting the choices of the data subject. We contend that this picture is
mistaken; data re-purposing, especially when data sets are combined, raises
novel questions about the impacts of research on groups and their implica-
tions for individuals regarded as falling within these groups. These impacts
suggest that the controversies about de-identification or re-consent for re-use
are to some extent beside the point. Serious ethical questions are also raised
by the inferences that may be drawn about individuals from the research and
resulting risks of stigmatization. These risks may arise even when individuals
were not part of the original data set being re-purposed. Data re-use,
143
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3371134 
re-purposing, and re-combination may have damaging effects on others not
included within the original data sets. These issues of justice for individuals
who might be regarded as indirect subjects of research are not even raised by
approaches that consider only the implications for or agreement of the origi-
nal data subject. This chapter argues that health information should be avail-
able for re-use, information should be available for use, but in a way that
does not yield unexpected surprises, produce direct harm to individuals, or
violate warranted trust.
Keywords: Justice; health data; public health; privacy; research; group
identity
INTRODUCTION
Re-using existing data sets has much to recommend it. Data are re-used when
they are collected for one use and then used a second time. They are re-
purposed when the second use has a different aim than the first. Much data re-
purposing in medical or public health research or practice involves information
that has been stripped of individual identifiers but some does not. In some
cases, the data were originally collected for research purposes and there was
consent to further research; this consent may have been quite limited or very
open-ended and the question is whether it covered the new research. In other
cases, the data were not collected for research but for medical treatment or for
some other purpose such as the individual’s personal interests or shopping
activities; this collection may or may not have involved any kind of consent to
further use with other aims. Data sets are also being combined and may contain
information with very different sources, consent histories, and individual
identifiers.
Much of the ethical and policy discussion about the permissibility of data
re-use has centered on two questions: for identifiable data, the scope of the
original consent and whether the re-use is permissible in light of that scope, and
for de-identified data, whether there are unacceptable risks that the data will be
re-identified in a manner that is harmful to any data subjects. Prioritizing these
questions rests on a picture of the ethics of data use as primarily about respect-
ing the choices of the data subject. It also assumes that, once de-identified,
information is no longer in important senses “about” the subject and that its
use becomes ethically problematic only if it can be re-linked to the subject.
While controversies about consent and de-identification surely matter, in this
chapter, we argue that they are by no means the only, or perhaps even the most
important, questions to ask about data re-use.
Instead, data re-purposing, especially when data sets are combined, raises
novel questions about the impacts of research on groups and their implications
for individuals regarded as falling within these groups. These impacts suggest
that the controversies about de-identification or re-consent for re-use are to
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some extent beside the point. Serious ethical questions are also raised by the
inferences that may be drawn about individuals from the research and resulting
risks of stigmatization. These risks may arise even when individuals were not
part of the original data set being re-purposed. Data re-use, re-purposing, and
re-combination may have damaging effects on others not included within the
original data sets. These issues of justice for individuals who might be regarded
as indirect subjects of research are not even raised by approaches that consider
only the implications for or agreement of the original data subject.
The primary information we consider in this article is information originat-
ing in clinical research and in electronic health records (EHRs). We refer to this
as “health information,” although noting that a great deal of information about
health may originate elsewhere, for example, in wearable devices worn for
recreational purposes. Health information collected within the original confines
of treatment or research is information that many people regard as especially
sensitive and that in fact can be quite damaging if it is misused. It is informa-
tion that has been collected within relationships of trust and expectations of
confidentiality. It is also information that may be regarded as accurate in a way
that other information about health is not (whether or not this is actually true;
it is at least information that has been vetted in some more expert way than
information collected or reported by individuals themselves.) So it is not
surprising that attention has been directed to the role of informed consent for
new uses of these data. Our concern, however, is that the ethical issues raised
by uses of this information are not well delineated by the scope of informed
consent as it is typically understood.
We should also note at the outset that we are not at all opposed to data re-
use. To the contrary, one concern that we have about the focus on informed
consent and de-identification is distortion of the ability to use information to
improve health care and public health. On our view, information should be
available for use, but in a way that does not yield unexpected surprises, produce
direct harm to individuals, or violate warranted trust.
We begin by describing the scope and benefits of data re-purposing. We then
turn to an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of consent and de-
identification strategies. Next, we outline ways in which data re-purposing may
affect not only original data subjects but also others who are similar to them in
relevant ways. We conclude by arguing that these effects indicate problems of
social justice in data use that are not touched upon by consent or de-identification
strategies.
THE SCOPE AND APPEAL OF RE-PURPOSING DATA
It is fair to say that massive amounts of re-purposing of health information are
occurring today. Here, we describe four types: the use of information initially
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collected for one research study in a different study; the use of information
initially collected for medical treatment for medical research; the use of infor-
mation initially collected either for research or for treatment for public health
purposes; and the use of information initially collected either for research or
for treatment for commercial purposes. We conclude this section with a descrip-
tion of the precision medicine initiative (the PMI) and its vision for a data
source that can be put to many different uses.
At present, two different federal regulatory regimes apply to these kinds of
information. For information collected for research, the primary regulatory
regime is the federal Common Rule (45 C.F.R. Part 46).1 The Common Rule
defines human subjects research to include only research with living human
beings that collects personally identifiable information (45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f)).
It thus does not apply to research involving medical records of persons who
have subsequently died, even if the information might be quite sensitive and
have implications for family members of these patients. It requires informed
consent for research that does involve human subjects, even if the research
involves only data and does not require contact with the individual (45 C.F.R.
§ 46.111(4)). Informed consent may be waived; however, if the committee
responsible for reviewing the research determines that the research could not
practicably be carried out without the waiver and the information, the research
involves no more than minimal risk, the waiver will not adversely affect the
rights or welfare of subjects, and if appropriate the subjects will be given addi-
tional information after conclusion of the study (45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d)).
Among these rights of subjects is the protection of confidentiality. Waivers are
granted frequently (e.g., Northwestern, 2016).
For most information originally collected for medical treatment or payment,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy
Rule governs (45 C.F.R. Part 164). The Privacy Rule, like the Common Rule,
does not apply to information that does not identify individuals, but it sets out
strict standards for de-identification (45 C.F.R. 164.514(b)). Unlike the
Common Rule, the Privacy Rule applies to information about individuals who
have died, up until 50 years after their deaths (45 C.F.R. 164.502(f)). Thus, if
informed consent is required for use of this information, it must be sought
from personal representatives who may be difficult to identify or find. In addi-
tion to de-identified information, which it does not cover, the Privacy Rule also
permits use of information in a “limited dataset.” This is a data set that
excludes all potential identifiers except ZIP Codes and dates (including data of
birth and date of treatment). These data sets may be used only for research or
for public health and their use must be covered by a data use agreement that
protects confidentiality (45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)). Limited data sets are of some
utility; they allow, for example, investigation of potential correlations with age
or environmental conditions. They do not, however, contain the kind of infor-
mation that would allow linkages to other data sets, such as information
collected from social media sites or devices worn by patients to collect information
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about their daily activities. Other uses of information from EHRs for research
require what HIPAA calls an “authorization” from patients, which must
include a description of the specific purpose of the research and its potential
end point (which may just be a vague “at the end of the research”) (45 C.F.R. §
164.508(c)). Waivers of the authorization requirement are permitted for use of
information in research, however. To grant a waiver, a review board must find
that the research presents no more than minimal risk to privacy because identi-
fiers will be protected from improper use and destroyed as soon as they are no
longer needed, that there are adequate written assurances that the information
will not be re-used except for other research permitted under a waiver, and that
the research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver and use of
the information (45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)).
A persistent difficulty has been that these two regulatory structures do not
fit together seamlessly. They apply to different groups of people, have different
rules about de-identification, and somewhat different standards for waivers. A
further concern of researchers is that the rules are cumbersome, cause delays,
and make it difficult to share information or combine it with other data sets
(Nass, Levit, & Gostin, 2009). Five years after implementation of the Privacy
Rule, the Association of Academic Health Centers protested that it had erected
major barriers to research involving medical records. These barriers included
difficulties in sharing information among centers in ways that might be particu-
larly damaging to translational research and research involving genetic infor-
mation (AAHC, 2008). Since AU:22011, Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) has engaged in a protracted process to amend the Common Rule, about
which more below.
Information Originally Collected in Medical Research and
Re-Used in Research
As clinical trials are structured today, it is not unusual for information
collected for one research study to be made available for use in another. The
appeal of re-purposed data analysis includes cost savings with the use of an
existing data set. When the data were collected for and have been used in
research, the expectation is that the data set is of proven quality given its
past and presumably successful use. An additional attraction is the possibility
that the re-use of the original data set may open up new research connections
between the original project and novel research initiatives. As more and more
is learned about disease etiology, it is becoming apparent that some diseases
that have been grouped together based on clinical presentation are not at all
the same, whereas others that have seemed different may be more related
than originally believed. Achieving this kind of understanding for cancer is
one of the goals of the PMI, for example. On the other hand, information
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may be needed for the new study that was not collected for the first one, so
there may be need to link the original data set to either newly collected data
or other relevant data sets.
As one example of data re-use, consider studies under the umbrella of
SWOG (originally the Southwest Oncology Group). SWOG is a network of
physicians, health care institutions, and designated cancer centers, in the
United States and internationally. It typically has over 20,000 patients enrolled
in active trials; since its origin, it has enrolled over 200,000 patients. And,
“SWOG also manages a biorepository of 600,000 specimens with associated
clinical data  assets that are routinely used by other researchers, resulting in
exciting new discoveries long after trials are completed” (SWOG, 2016). As an
example, SWOG has samples and records from two large prostate cancer
prevention trials which includes long-term follow up of healthy men and men
with prostate, lung, colon, and other cancers. The SWOG data are available for
cancer researchers and for researchers interested in other conditions.
Researchers using the SWOG data and specimens must sign data use agree-
ments meeting SWOG policies. These policies include informed consent from
the patient at the time of sample collection. Sample informed consent forms
available online state that the samples may be used for research about cancer
or other diseases, that the information will not be sold, that it may be linked to
information from medical records, and that researchers will not be given per-
sonally identifiable information. Statements about data re-use are open-ended
and limited only to use in research  even though patients were originally
entered into research about cancer and may have believed that any planned
future research would also involve cancer. SWOG policies have exceptions
to the requirement of informed consent if the sample banking is retroactive
(i.e., takes place after the study has been concluded) or involves samples origi-
nally collected for nonresearch purposes, as long as the collection otherwise
meets the HHS criteria for waiver of informed consent. Samples are stored in a
manner that does not allow direct identification of patients; electronic data-
bases containing patient information also must not have names and other infor-
mation that can directly identify patients or be linked to other databases that
could identify patients. The SWOG tissue bank does keep identifiers, but they
must be firewalled from individual researchers. The system has limited access
and does not allow direct contact with patients; it also prohibits communica-
tion of any research data to patients or their physicians except for protocols
that are expressly to be used for treatment decisions. IRB approval is required
for any nonexempt studies using SWOG samples or data (SWOG, 2016a). As a
reminder, federal regulations governing research with human subjects do not
apply to deceased persons or to entirely anonymous materials; studies using
these materials are exempt, as described above.
SWOG practices are typical of current approaches to the re-use of informa-
tion originally collected for research. They do not require consent at all for
fully de-identified information. They are open-ended about future uses, stating
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only that these uses will be limited to research. Some might regard further
research use as sufficiently similar to the purpose of the original data collection;
others might judge that it is re-purposing if the information is used for research
on very different medical conditions such as schizophrenia, or for research on
costs of care or other social factors. SWOG policies allow linkage of informa-
tion from medical records but do not give future researchers information that
could allow them to know who individual patients are. These practices follow
the currently operative rules governing research with human subjects, but may
require changes with adoption of the proposed amendments to the Common
Rule, described below.
Information Originally Collected in Medical Treatment and
Re-Purposed for Research
The widespread use of EHRs has made it far easier to re-purpose information
collected in clinical care for medical research. Such research includes studies of
the safety and efficacy of treatment, cost-effectiveness or comparative effective-
ness of treatment, drugdrug interactions, rare side effects, and so on. It also
includes observations of patterns and linkages that are only possible with large
sets of clinical data. Methodologies are under development to allow retrospec-
tive analysis of these large data sets to answer questions that might otherwise
have required expensive and lengthy randomized clinical trials (Safran, 2014).
Medical centers routinely using patient data in research inform their patients in
their privacy policies about the possibility that information in their medical
records may be used in research; the information is then used under waivers of
authorization (e.g., UCSF, 2016).
As outlined above, current federal regulations impose some constraints on
re-purposing clinical data for research. De-identification is one way around
these constraints, but it limits the utility of the information and, as we discuss
below, may not meet all ethical concerns. Waivers of the informed consent and
authorization requirements are the most common strategy employed when
researchers want to use information that has not been de-identified. These waiv-
ers focus primarily on the need for the information, the great difficulty involved
in re-contacting patients if a waiver is not granted, the possibility that the data
will be biased if certain groups of patients refuse consent, and the strategies
researchers will use to protect confidentiality. Waivers also impose ongoing
constraints on data re-purposing for research, in the form of data use agree-
ments and limitation of the approval to the study in question. Complex constel-
lations of data use agreements are currently in place for large-scale data-
sharing arrangements for research purposes.
As noted above, HHS began the process of revamping the Common Rule in
2011, with publication of an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-making
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designed to adjust research protections to research risks (HHS, 2011). After
receiving and analyzing voluminous comments, HHS published the NPRM AU:3for
changes in the Common Rule in September 2015 (HHS, 2015). The changes,
not yet adopted, would require consent to be given for any re-use of biospeci-
mens originally collected for research, even if they do not contain identifying
information. This consent could be very broad, simply indicating that the speci-
men may be used in any future research. It would thus not give individuals any
concrete ideas about what kind of research might be possible in the future using
samples drawn from them in identifiable or de-identified fashion. The revamp-
ing would also exempt from review re-use of identifiable information collected
for nonresearch purposes, such as the medical records linked to tissue samples
or medical records used in research more generally, as long as there was general
notice to patients that the information might be used in research. No further
specification of types of research would be required. Confidentiality would still
need to be protected, however. It is fair to say that the NPRM proposed revi-
sions view the primary risks of information re-use to be patient identification
(hence, the concern with biospecimens, which as they contain patient genetic
information may be ineluctably identifiable) and confidentiality, rather than the
further issues we raise below.
Information Originally Collected for Research or Clinical Care and
Re-Used for Public Health
State public health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention receive a great deal of information originating in clinical care.
Under HIPAA, this information may be transferred for public health purposes
as authorized by statute without patient authorization (45 C.F.R. § 164.512
(b)). Information transferred should be limited to the minimum necessary
required (45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)). All states have tumor registries; these regis-
tries are supported by the National Cancer Institute and are compiled into
databases that allow research about cancer incidence, prevalence, and treatment
(NIH 2016). These data can be linked to other data such as Medicare claims
data registries, allowing vast possibilities for research. Data from the registries
have been used to identify groups of people at higher risk for cancer, such as
organ transplant recipients or women whose mothers took DES during preg-
nancy (Smith, White, Weir, Peipins, & Thompson, 2012). Data from cancer
registries have also been combined with data from state birth defect registries
to yield findings such as significantly increased cancer risks among children
born with certain birth defects (Carozza, Langlois, Miller, & Canfield, 2012).
These resources are rich and tremendously valuable and illustrate the possibility
and importance of unexpected findings.
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Once information has been transferred for public health purposes, it is no
longer subject to HIPAA. Public health departments may need to conform to
other federal regulations, such as if they conduct federally funded research with
the information. But state freedom of information act laws also may allow
public access to information. For example, communities may want to identify
cancer clusters and analyze possible associations with environmental exposures.
In one case, a local newspaper in southern Illinois sought state cancer registry
data to investigate a possible cluster of childhood neuroblastoma; the state
objected that there were sufficiently small numbers of children with the cancer
in question to allow identification if the data were released. The Illinois
Supreme Court construed the public’s right to freedom of information broadly
and held that the state had not shown that the information would “tend” to
lead to the discovery of private information, despite the testimony of an expert
in re-identification that she could identify some patients accurately using regis-
try information combined with other publicly available information.
Information originally collected for research may also be subject to state law
reporting requirements such as reports of infectious disease diagnoses or
reports of abuse. This is considered a risk of research and patients are generally
told about the possibility of these risks in the informed consent process.
Information thus transferred to health departments is no longer subject to the
rules protecting research subjects, however. One way for researchers to try to
protect against requests for disclosure from public health or from law enforce-
ment is to seek a federal “Certificate of Confidentiality,” but it is unclear how
much protection these give (Wolf, Patel, Williams, Austin, & Dame, 2013).
Many state public health authorities also sell data sets, subject to applicable
state law restrictions. State health authorities may operate on limited public
funds and use revenue from data sales to finance some of their operations. The
data sold are typically de-identified and subject to data use agreements intended
to prevent re-identification. The data may be valuable for research, analysis of
health trends, reviews of healthcare utilization and costs, insurance underwrit-
ing, understanding the relation between health and other community variables,
and developing various metrics for rating community life, among other
purposes.
Information Originally Collected for Research or Clinical Care and
Re-Used for Commercial Purposes
Many large health care centers aggregate and monetize their patient data. For
example, the Cleveland Clinic and the Geisinger Health System have engaged
in such enterprises. Explorys is an IBM data analytics product that is a spinoff
from the Cleveland Clinic; it has data on over 50 million people and provides
solutions for problems such as management of at-risk populations and
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measurement of costs of care (IBM, 2016). xG Health Solutions uses Geisinger
data to provide analytics for other health care systems seeking to identify areas
where utilization or costs are too high, or where they can improve care quality
and efficiency (xG, 2016).
Under the HITECH Act amendments to HIPAA in 2009, special patient
authorization is required for the sale of identifiable protected health informa-
tion (HITECH Act § 13405(d)(4)). This provision was motivated by charges
that data aggregators were assembling large data banks of information regard-
ing patients from prescription records that could then be sold to insurance
companies for underwriting, with the result that some patients would pay more
for their coverage (Nakashima, 2008). Authorization is not required, however,
if the information sold is de-identified. Particularly valuable databases are
prescription records from pharmacies and pharmacy benefit management
companies that are de-identified as to patients but that contain the identity of
the prescribing physician. These data allow pharmaceutical companies to track
provider prescribing behavior so that they can tailor advertising or identify
providers who might be willing to enroll patients in clinical trials. De-identified
patient information from EHRs has also been used in this way. Although
several states tried to ban the practice of selling pharmaceutical records de-
identified as to patients for commercial use, believing that it contributed to
inflated drug prices, the US Supreme Court held that the bans violated the
First Amendment protection of freedom of expression (Sorrell v. IMS Health,
131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011)). Data from the Pew Foundation indicate that when
sensitive information such as health information is involved, consumers are
especially concerned about data re-use and the extent of data retention; they
are more willing to share information with health care providers they trust and
they consider the benefits they may obtain in deciding whether or not to share
information (Rainie & Duggan, 2016). These findings suggest that the public
concerns about data re-use are not limited to identifiable information, a point
to which we return later.
The Precision Medicine Initiative and Information Re-Use
The PMI is a highly ambitious effort to create a cohort of over a million volun-
teers to investigate the molecular, environmental, and behavioral aspects of
disease. It aims to develop an understanding of important variations among
patients that will enable targeting therapeutic or other interventions to maxi-
mize success in treatment and prevention of disease. The information collected
about cohort participants will be extensive: blood and possible other tissue
samples, information from EHRs, a baseline physical exam, insurance claims,
mobile health devices, participant surveys, and other sources. And cohort
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participants will be expected to agree to be re-contacted over time to participate
in a variety of more specific research studies (PMI Working Group, 2015).
The PMI thus is designed to permit data re-use on a grand scale. As indi-
viduals are enrolled in the cohort, there will be an overall promise of what it
may achieve but no precise information about how the data will be used,
how frequently individuals will be re-contacted, what studies will be of inter-
est, how long the data will be valuable, whether other data will be needed
and combined with the types of data sought initially, and what will ultimately
be learned. Any consent at enrollment therefore must perforce be highly
general, based on whatever parameters can reasonably be anticipated. But
these parameters may change as more is learned and unanticipated connec-
tions are identified.
At the outset, the Obama White House announced principles of privacy and
trust for the PMI, which included transparency. Five aspects of transparency
were highlighted:
 dynamic information sharing to ensure that all PMI participants remain
adequately informed throughout all stages of participation;
 communication of information about how, when, and where samples will be
stored; generally how data will be used, accessed, and shared; types of
studies for which the individual’s data may be used; the goals, potential
benefits, and risks of participation, including risks of inappropriate use or
compromise of the information about participants; the privacy and security
measures that are in place to protect participant data, including notification
plans in the event of a breach; and the participant’s ability to withdraw from
the cohort at any time, with the understanding that consent for research use
of data included in aggregate data sets or used in past studies and studies
already begun cannot be withdrawn;
 information about data protection and rules of governance;
 prompt notification of any data breaches; and
 published summaries of research findings (White House, 2015).
These transparency considerations recognize that any initial information for
participants will need to be quite general. They thus require ongoing communi-
cation with participants about what is being done and what has been learned.
Putting these requirements into practice will involve far more robust means of
communication with research subjects than has been common practice. One of
the aims of the PMI is to enroll and engage very diverse participants, which
will augment the challenges of ongoing communication. The PMI working
group’s recommendations about development of the cohort emphasize the
importance of returning their data to participants but does not explain other
aspects of continuing communication such as information about what is being
learned through the PMI (PMI Working Group, 2015).
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FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES AND DATA RE-USE:
INDIVIDUAL NOTICE AND CONSENT
Individual notice and consent has been one of the primary methods for addres-
sing data re-purposing. The first comprehensive statement of what are now
called Fair Information Practices (FIPs) occurred in a report for the US
Department of Health, Education and Welfare published in 1973 (Gellman,
2016). The highly influential report, “Records, Computers and the Rights of
Citizens,” stated five basic principles for data protection. One of the principles
explicitly prohibited data re-purposing without consent: There must be a way
for an individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his
consent. Among other principles were that databases should not be secret and
that data subjects should be given rights to correct any misinformation in them.
Notice and choice is pervasive in US data protection policies, as described
above. It is reflected in the Common Rule emphasis on the informed consent of
subjects to participation in research. It is also reflected in the HIPAA require-
ment that patients must authorize the use or disclosure of their information for
specific research studies unless a waiver is given. The wealth of privacy policies
and “I agree” buttons on internet websites also illustrate the reach of notice
and choice.
European privacy law has presumptively strict provisions about consent for
data re-purposing, but with exceptions that permit uses similar to those permit-
ted in the United States. The new Data Protection Regulation (European
Parliament, 2016), to go into effect in 2018, provides that data processing is
unlawful without consent of the data subject to the specific purpose of the
processing unless certain other conditions are met, among them performance of
a task carried out in the public interest (Art. 6 §1(a), (e)). To decide whether it
is permissible to re-use information without further consent, the processor must
consider any links between the original purpose of the data collection and the
purposes of the further processing, the context of the processing including links
between the data subject and the processor, whether the data fall into particu-
larly sensitive categories, the benefits of the processing to the data subject, and
any appropriate safeguards (Art. 6 §4). For example, the standard ways in
which websites for sales over the internet interact with customers  initial
permission to collect information and use it in future transactions, including to
suggest products that the consumer might like and to advertise  is a permissi-
ble re-use, unless the information falls into a sensitive category or the customer
refuses. Consent must be clearly stated and the data subject must have the
authority to withdraw consent at any time (Art. 7). Real-time consent is neces-
sary for information in specified categories of sensitivity, including health infor-
mation and information about sexuality (Art. 9 §1). However, there are
exceptions to the consent requirement for using sensitive data in the interests of
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public health, health care quality, archiving data in the public interest, and
scientific or historical research, among others (Art. 9 §2 (i), (j)). Similar excep-
tions are provided to the much-discussed right to erasure of data that are no
longer needed for their original purpose (Art. 17 §3(c), (d)). Finally, like data
protection rules in the United States, the EU Data Protection Regulation
applies only to identifiable personal information (Art. 1, § 1 Art. 4(1)). Thus, it
is fair to say that in practice the EU Data Protection Regulation resembles
research and public health practice in the United States, although it imposes
more stringent consent requirements on re-purposing data in sensitive catego-
ries outside of these exceptions.
Such notice and choice approaches following FIPs place decisions about how
data are to be collected and used in the control of original data sources, not data
users. In theory, this is the approach that most respects individual choice. In
practice, it may be far less successful in achieving goals of active engagement in
these choices. Individuals may pay very little attention to the choices they make
and may be affected by various cognitive biases (Cate, 2010). Notice and choice,
moreover, typically occur at the point in time when information is originally
collected. It has been construed to permit the kind of general agreement
described above, such as the use of information gathered in one research study
for any future research, or the use of information gathered in treatment for any
research purposes. But there may never be follow up about what happens to the
information in the future research, particularly if data sets are de-identified or
merged (Ohm, 2014). At the point information is originally collected, the collec-
tor may have certain plans for the use of the information and the participants
may have certain expectations about how the information will be used  but
researcher’s plan may change as new connections become apparent or new
opportunities become available (Hoofnagle, 2016). Syndromic surveillance and
related statistical methods  noticing a pattern the significance of which was not
anticipated antecedently  may reveal insights that no one could have predicted
in advance or discussed in an informed consent process (Francis, Battin,
Jacobson, & Smith, 2009). In short, notice and choice assumes a data world that
is frozen in time. Although consent to original participation in the PMI will likely
be similarly general, the PMI’s commitment to following up with participants is
unusual and may make consent and the ability to withdraw it more meaningful.
Flaws in notice and choice reach significantly beyond the quality of individual
choice. The approach in terms of separate individual decisions also presents
collective action problems. Consent the second time around for data re-use may
prove elusive to obtain. Individuals may have died, moved, or be difficult to
locate. Individual choices about data collection and re-use may result in dispari-
ties in the information that is available for valuable social purposes such as pub-
lic health or medical research. Rothstein and Shoben (2013), supporters of new
consent for when data are re-purposed, argue that such bias is insignificant and
worth risking to further ethically responsible research. However, one study indi-
cates that the difficulties in re-contacting people may be significant and more
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severe than the likelihood that people will actually refuse consent. In this study,
of lung cancer, researchers sought to re-contact participants to ask whether the
data could be included in the federal database of genotypes and phenotypes
(dbGaP). A quarter of the initial subjects had died; over a third of the remaining
subjects could not be located; and there were significant differences in location
rates by age, race, and gender, but there was little difference in consent rates for
those who could be located (Cote, Harrison, Wenzlaff, & Schwartz, 2014).
At least one important study indicates that even if individuals would be will-
ing to consent to data re-purposing, they would like to have at least the oppor-
tunity for some say in the matter. In the words of this study, of patients being
asked to submit information to dbGaP, participants would be “glad you asked”
(Ludman et al., 2010). This may have been an especially sensitive study for
participants: it involved genetic information, and the study concerned the possi-
bility of genetic links to Alzheimer’s disease. The extent to which participants
in certain groups refuse consent or cannot be found may depend on levels of
trust in the research enterprise itself that depend in turn on perceived benefits
and harms to the group. The follow up urged by the Obama White House for
the PMI seeks to address this question of trust. These benefits or harms may or
may not be associated with the presence or absence of informed consent on the
part of original group participants in the research. Another collective action
problem with individual notice and choice is that individuals may want data
uses that are only available if others make similar choices to share their data 
but they may not be in a position to communicate with or to influence others in
making their decisions about what data to share or to suppress.
DE-IDENTIFICATION
If consent for a variety of reasons is hard to come by, then the preferred alter-
native for finding a way to re-purpose data without consent is to transform
identified data into de-identified data. The idea is that if participants in the
data set cannot be traced to the study, even though data from them will be
used in the study, the obligation to seek consent is moot. Primary objections to
this strategy include the limited utility of de-identified information, especially if
data sets are to be linked, and the risks of re-identification.
Many privacy advocates decry the possibility that data may be re-identified.
But risks of re-identification are a matter of significant controversy. Estimating
these risks depends on judgments about what other data sets are likely to be
available and what recipients of the information can be anticipated (el Emam,
Jabbouri, Sams, Drouet, & Power, 2006; Malin, Benitez, & Masys, 2011; Ohm,
2010). Re-identification risk also depends on the expertise of the re-identifier.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no reported court decisions in which
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people sued for damages claiming harm from re-identification of information
concerning them.2
Re-identification is not the only concern of privacy advocates; however,
Rothstein (2010) argues that it violates autonomy to use individuals’ informa-
tion without their consent, even in a de-identified data set. Others argue that
de-identified information can stigmatize individuals if it can be attributed to a
group and it is known that an individual is a member of that group (Vinterbo,
2011). Such stigmatization can occur even to members of the group who were
not included in the original study.
Schwartz and Solove (2011) take an intermediate position, rejecting as
reductionist the view that there are only two categories of personal data that
have implications for privacy and consent: identified and de-identified data.
They argue for a third category, identifiable data. These are data that are not at
present identified, but that could be at some future point, perhaps if other data
sets were to become available that contained information that could be used to
establish linkages. We share their concern; protections that do not take into
account implications about the possibilities for data re-use are at best lacking
in imagination and at worst irresponsible. However, we think their argument
points to a broader concern about the possibilities with de-identified data 
that these data could be used to draw problematic inferences, even when indivi-
duals have not actually been identified.
Consider as an example the much-discussed story of the re-purposing by
researchers at Arizona State University of information originally collected
from members of the Havasupai tribe for the study of diabetes. These data 
de-identified  were used for further studies of schizophrenia, inbreeding, and
tribal migration patterns, topics that were highly disfavored by the tribe. The
tribe sued, and Arizona State eventually settled, despite the fact that the use of
re-purposed, de-identified information met the standards of the Common Rule.
Commentators have argued that this case demonstrates the importance of
including data re-purposing with de-identification within the purview of
informed consent. (Mello & Wolf, 2010; Rothstein, 2011). The case has also 
been used to suggest exploring alternative consent models, such as tiered
consent under which some participants agree to a wider scope of subsequent
uses than others, or consulting the community in addition to seeking consent
from individual participants (Mello & Wolf, 2010). These suggestions extend
the model of informed consent rather than moving beyond it to address the
problems with data re-purposing to which we now turn.
INDIRECT SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH
At times, research may affect others than the individuals who are its primary
focus. Contagious disease research presents particularly good examples of the
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possibilities others might be indirect subjects of research. One way is that infor-
mation may be collected about them, albeit not directly from them. For exam-
ple, research about questions such as the efficacy of treatment as prevention as
a strategy for lowering rates of HIV transmission may wish not only to collect
data about the subjects using the intervention but also about their sexual part-
ners. Some such research might seek to enroll the partners as subjects as well
and seek their informed consent. But other research strategies might never
involve contacting the partners to obtain their consent or collect data directly
from them. For example, the study might collect information about their sexual
partners from the direct participants and then compare this information with
reports to the health department of positive HIV tests. These strategies might
be especially appealing if there were concerns that partners could not be found
or would not agree to study participation. Nonetheless, the second strategy has
direct implications for the partners. Participants in the study may change their
behavior if they believe they are less likely to transmit disease because of their
participation in the study, despite what they have been told about the study’s
experimental nature. And information about the partners is being used in the
study, information derived from the direct study participants and from health
department records although not directly from the partners themselves.
Studies involving contagious diseases may also affect others even if no infor-
mation is collected about them. Consider testing of a new vaccine. The goal of
the study may be to ascertain the extent of immunity created in subjects receiv-
ing the vaccine. Despite warnings that the vaccine is experimental, participants
in the research may believe that they are better protected against the disease.
They may thus behave in ways that increase the risks to others of catching the
disease.
In an earlier paper, one of us argued that research ethics should pay atten-
tion to risks to indirect participants (Francis, Battin, Botkin, Jacobson, &
Smith, 2006). Study designs should attempt to minimize risks, for example, by
limiting and protecting the data collected about third parties. Consent processes
with direct participants should inform them of any risks to third parties, such
as possibilities of contagion. If risks are sufficiently high, indirect participants
should be informed of them and perhaps even included in the informed consent
process.
The forms of data re-purposing described above may present analogies to
the situation of indirect subjects in contagious disease research. Information
from direct study participants may include information about others not partic-
ipating directly in the research. For example, study participants may be asked
to give medical histories involving identifiable information about their family
members. Medical records also may contain information about others, includ-
ing family members. Although the original research or treatment would not
have been about the others mentioned in the record, there is nothing to prevent
further research being about them. This is particularly true if the original data
sets are combined with other data sets containing information about these
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individuals. For example, the original data set might have involved treatment
or research of parents during the prenatal or perinatal period. With identifiable
information, later research might link these records to further records about
outcomes for the children. Or, research or treatment originally involving indivi-
duals with certain cancers might later be linked to other data sets such as state
tumor registries to investigate whether there are familial patterns and whether
other factors might be involved in phenotypic expression within families. If
data sets are de-identified to the point of limited data sets, and linked to other
data sets about individuals in the same location or with similar dates of treat-
ment, inferences about disease patterns may be drawn. These patterns might in
turn be used to draw inferences about others from the same location or with
the same dates of treatment  even if these others were never included in
the original data sets. Similar problems may arise through the re-use and re-
combination of data sets that are sufficiently de-identified as not to allow
results to be connected directly to particular individuals by name. Instead, the
results could be connected if they reveal powerful and disturbing relationships
between variables. For example, de-identified information could show that
someone who lived in a particular area of the country, was of a given race or
ethnic background and sex, and had purchased certain products, was highly
likely to have an asymptomatic infection. No one would need link the de-identified
information that had been used in the study to particular study individuals to infer
that someone who met all of the variables was at high infection risk.
The power of data re-use, especially when data sets are combined, is that it
affords possibilities that the later research might actually include people as
subjects who were never direct subjects of the original data collection. It may
also allow further inferences to be drawn about people who were never associ-
ated with the original research. While these possibilities are not exactly conta-
gion  no one gets sick because others participated in research  they do pose
potential risks for others that cannot be addressed by consent of the original
research participants, even if it extends to the further data use. For example,
the results of the Arizona State University research on the Havasupai applied
to any tribal members who were not participants in the study, just as much as
it applied to participants. The conclusions about tribal in-breeding or about
migration patterns were not conclusions limited to the individual tribal
members who participated in the study; they were conclusions about anyone
who is a member of the tribe. This is not to deny the importance of these kinds
of linkage studies that can be performed through data re-use and re-combination.
The knowledge that people might have latent infections is surely valuable, as the
experience with asymptomatic Hepatitis C indicates. The point instead is that
risks of stigma from such uses of information must also be addressed. These risks
of stigma may result from the discovery of patterns that could not have been
anticipated in advance and that may not be associated with groupings based on
standard demographic variables such as race or income level. It is to the concerns
of justice raised by these possibilities that we now turn.
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GROUPS AND IDENTITIES
Research ethics pays significant attention to groups identified as “vulnerable”
in the sense that they are more likely to be subject to harm or that they are
less likely to be able to protect themselves from harm. The Common Rule,
for example, has special protections for pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates
(45 C.F.R. Part 46, Subpart B); it also urges review boards to include
additional safeguards to protect the “rights and welfare” of groups likely to be
vulnerable to coercion: children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled
persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons (45 C.F.R.
§111(b)). The Declaration of Helsinki § 20 provides that any group or individ-
ual susceptible to increased risks of incurring additional harm may only be
involved in research if the research cannot be carried out in less vulnerable
populations and the group stands to benefit from the research (WMA, 2013).
The European Regulation on clinical trials (which only applies to interven-
tional research), Art. 10, lists special considerations for minors, incapacitated
subjects, pregnant or breastfeeding women, and participation by specific groups
of subjects where expertise is needed (European Parliament, 2014). These
efforts to provide special protection have come under criticism for unjustified
paternalism, for vague definitions of vulnerability, and for the risk that they
may unduly limit the possibilities of some groups to participate in the genera-
tion of medical knowledge relevant to them (e.g., Gennet, Andorna, & Elger,
2015; Whitney, 2014). The Declaration of Helsinki provision, aimed primarily
at research in impoverished countries and strengthened to require actual benefit
to the group in 2013, has been criticized for failure to say more about what
benefits might be required and how they may be assured (Malik & Foster,
2016).
These formal statements about groups stop short of actually identifying
any particular types of groups, other than prisoners, pregnant women, people
with disabilities, and people who are educationally or economically disadvan-
taged. These are people who primarily fall in groups thought to need particu-
lar protection to ensure that consent is voluntarily given. They rely on the
assumption that certain demographic groups  often race, religion, or ethnic-
ity are added into the mix  can be identified in advance as potentially at
increased risk. The recommended approach is then to put in place special
protections, typically for the informed consent process. In the latest version
of the Declaration of Helsinki, the approach is also to require the assurance
of benefits to the communities from which subjects supposed to be vulnerable
are drawn.
This approach reflects a standard way of thinking about groups in US
social scientific inquiry. Conventionally, the focus is on groups that are given
or claim to fall into a given demographic category. This may be an ethnic or
racial identity, a religious or cultural identity, or a socioeconomic class.
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Many of these groups are identified in census categories that have implica-
tions for public policy and in some cases for civil rights protection. Some ini-
tial research may focus on these groups, for example, HIV research in
African-American males. Even this research may have spillover effects on
others who are identified as members of the group but who were not partici-
pants in the research. These results may be particularly problematic if the
group has been subject to disparagement or marginalization by other, often
larger and better positioned groups in the society. For example, social scien-
tific reports that draw repeated attention to relationships between rates of
incarceration, patterns of education, and per capita income may be construed
as applicable to all members of a group that may only have common skin
color or some other attribute that is not linked to much else save the negative
judgment of others outside the group. The stigma associated with groups
believed to be carriers of communicable diseases that are frightening but little
understood may result in members of such groups being ostracized. Examples
include Haitians during the early days of the HIV epidemic  HIV was even
characterized as “the Haitian disease” at one point  and travelers returning
from Mexico after supposed identification of a serious form of H1N1 influ-
enza there.
Further questions about the treatment of groups may arise with data re-
purposing. As with the Havasupai example, later research questions may have
far different aims than the original consent. The kind of very general consent to
“future research” that is often requested does not place limits on these changes,
as long as the re-use is for research. New research may also identify unexpected
constellations of factors  defining groups that have not heretofore been
considered “vulnerable” or even groups at all. Identification of such novel
connections is a core aim of the PMI. Other examples might be groups identi-
fied with exposures: Legionnaires or veterans of particular wars or travelers to
Brazil who might have been bitten by mosquitoes carrying the Zika virus.
Neither consent nor re-identification strategies provide particularly good pro-
tection in such cases. Consent fails because aims, risks, and benefits cannot be
described in advance, nor can the individuals who may be affected. De-
identification fails because the problem is not that stigma will be attached to
individuals through their identities but that it will attach due to their group
membership. We thus disagree with the common assumption in the United
States and the EU that, once a data set has been successfully de-identified,
secondary data analysis may go forward as privacy has been protected.
Another dimension should be considered in reviewing the adequacy of de-
identified data protection: the importance assigned to group identification in
the new research agenda that is proposed. If the analysis of re-purposed data
will focus on a group that is composed in part or entirely of individuals who
may be identified with the group that is the subject of the new research,
implications for the group must be considered. These include the concepts of
autonomy and dignity that are closely associated with protecting privacy, if
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members of the group may be subject to the disapproving gaze of others for
what they do. For example, members of a group associated with sexually
transmitted diseases may be chastened for having unprotected sex even if
they had no awareness of or involvement in the study identifying the risk.
Travelers to an area newly identified with Zika may be criticized for their
failure to use birth control during the trip  even if they had no reason to
know that the disease had spread to the area. If the connections with group
membership are not carefully described, or if the supposed connection is
overblown, even more individuals may be subject to inferences that hold
them in disdain. There may be economic consequences as well, such as forms
of red-lining in insurance or sales if bank default rates statistically suggest a
much higher default rate for one group over another demographic group. In
such cases, individual privacy is not directly violated in the sense that indivi-
duals are included in studies without their consent or that they are picked
out from the group. But the values that lie behind privacy are weakened
nonetheless.
Health research is an area where distinctions between individuals and groups
matter clearly. A group that in comparison to other groups has disproportion-
ately shown higher rates of a severe communicable disease or a genetically
transmitted disease that may cut life short may be criticized, stigmatized, or
worse. The identified group that is perceived as unusually susceptible may see
individual members of a group experience discrimination or rejection socially
and economically. These identifications may track traditionally recognized vul-
nerable groups, as the Chinese in Chinatown in San Francisco were identified
with bubonic plague at the turn of the 20th century. But it may track other
connecting factors identified in the research: neighborhood, work space, travel
locations, or even entirely new interactions among environmental or genetic or
other factors. These identifications are part of the promise of big data and of
initiatives such as the PMI. But their implications require attention as a matter
of justice.
In this regard, we recommend asking these new questions about research
involving re-purposed data:
(1) Is the research likely to generate findings about a group that may be delete-
rious to people identified with the group, whether or not data from them
are entered into one or more of the data sets involved in the research? In
such situations, research findings may deepen disadvantage (Wolff &
deShalit, 2007).
(2) Are the findings in (1) novel with respect to one or more groups? We iden-
tify this as a separate question because it may be that the information about
the group is already generally known. For example, research about migra-
tion patterns for other tribes might make the findings about the Havasupai
less novel and thus less likely to be as deleterious as they otherwise would
be. Indeed, such research about migration patterns has become common.
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On the other hand, research about inbreeding within the tribe would be
novel, even if similar studies have been done with other groups.
(3) Is the research likely to generate associations that identify new groups in
ways that might be stigmatizing or disadvantaging? Are these associations
ones that individuals are unlikely to have anticipated and that might be AU:7 
disadvantageous to them? Answering this question requires frequent re-
evaluation, if research questions change or if novel patterns become appar-
ent. These patterns of course may be very valuable in identifying disease
risks, but their potential for stigmatization should also be considered, not
to halt the research but to raise questions about how research results can
best be communicated to avoid deleterious effects when possible. Other aspects of 
this may be the need to try to communicate the information to individuals who may 
be identified with the group, both so that they may be aware of the possible risks and 
so that they may learn about potential
benefits of the research.
(4) Are there offsetting benefits for individuals involved in the research as well
as for individuals who might be associated with the research? If not, is it
justifiable to include the individuals in the research or to report findings
that may reveal possible implications about them? The Declaration of
Helsinki requires that research with vulnerable populations be offset by
benefits for them. Here, what we have in mind is the possibility that new
vulnerabilities may be created by research using re-purposed data in the
enormously powerful ways that are available today. Red-lining in insurance
or sales for groups newly identified as at risk is an example of these possi-
bilities. The Declaration has in mind impoverished populations across the
globe that have been used for pharmaceutical trials and the possibility of
providing some health care for them in return.
What we suggest here instead is along the lines of the Obama White
House transparency principles for the PMI: that there should be ongoing
efforts to inform people of how data uses are producing findings that are
important to them. Unfortunately, the initial steps in implementing the PMI
have not yet addressed concrete strategies for this. But there are several ways
this might be done. One is publishing regular descriptions, in lay language, of
research findings with highlights about those for whom they are most impor-
tant. Another is sending reports of relevant research results to individuals for
whom they might make a difference. The PMI is somewhat unique in that it
preserves the possibilities for re-contacting individuals because of plans to
collect longitudinal data. Data sets with identifiable information may well
contain electronic addresses of individuals whose data are involved; messages
to them could include suggestions that they contact others for whom the
information might also be useful. Even when data have been de-identified as
to data subjects, research and treatment information may contain contact
information for the original researcher or treating physician. Communications
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to them could help get the word out to people from whom the data were
originally collected. Such communication, if interactive, could also help alert
the researchers re-using the data about likely concerns of those from whom
the data originated and others like them.
CONCLUSION
Re-use of data originally collected for research or treatment has enormous
potential. As the PMI recognizes, this potential is magnified when data sets can
be combined and when data can be collected over time. The standard concerns
raised about these uses are that they may violate individual consent or that
they might directly damage individual subjects through re-identification. In this
chapter, we have argued that these may not in fact be the most important
concerns, and that issues about stigmatization or disadvantage may be present
even for individuals who were not included in the original data sets. As novel
patterns are identified, these issues may not track conventional understandings
of vulnerable population groups. We have suggested a number of strategies
that might be used to communicate both risks and benefits so that research
may be conducted in a way that is just both to those whose data are involved
and to others who may be affected by the research.
NOTES
1. In September, 2015, a Notice of Proposed Rule-making for revisions of the
Common Rule was posted (80 Fed. Reg. 53933, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2015-09-08/pdf/2015-21756.pdf). As of this writing, no final rule had been issued. It
remains to be seen whether de-regulatory efforts of the Trump administration will affect
data use and the regulations governing it.
2. To reach this conclusion, we conducted searches of the Westlaw allcases database
for de-identif! Information; de-identifying information; re-identif! Information, (“re-
identif! information”) & “de-identified information”; research study & “de-identified
information”; re-identified & individuals & “de-identified information”; and cases citing
§164.514.
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